(Paul Rosenberg, Interviewed by Louis James,
Editor,
International Speculator)
L:
We are talking today with one of Doug Casey's favorite cryptology
technologists, a once-shadowy figure named
um
I'm never sure with
cypherpunk types. What name can we use? We're on the record here.
Paul:
[Laughs] Paul Rosenberg is fine, Lobo. We won't be breaking any laws
today.
L:
All right then. Paul Rosenberg. Paul is a longtime friend of Doug's
and the author of
well
is there anything you'd care to admit to
being the author of?
Paul:
I'll go on the record and say that I'm the author of
A Lodging of Wayfaring Men and a bunch of other books as
well.
L:
That's a book Doug has commented on favorably and recommended a number
of times. It's full of interesting ideas, with perhaps those on
information privacy and private commerce being among the most
discussed. Paul's company also publishes the annual
Electronic Police State rankings. In related news, there's been a
lot of commentary we've mentioned it in Casey's Daily Dispatch
about the school district in Pennsylvania that spied on its students
in their homes via the cameras in the computers they gave the kids.
Paul:
Yeah. Pretty horrifying.
L:
Horrifying, but it seems a lot of people are blasι about it. We were
talking earlier about how, in my rabble-rousing days before joining
the respectable Casey Research team, I was hip to Internet security, I
was trying to encourage everybody to use
PGP, or at least
Hushmail, and
trying to get people to secure their communications to use virtual
envelopes rather than postcards for their online communication.
It was like pulling teeth to get anyone to
even consider it, and nowadays it seems like even fewer people have a
clue, let alone care about this issue. Here we have this
slap-in-the-face example of exactly why people should take electronic
privacy seriously, but people are more interested in whether or not
Sarah Palin's daughter will get married.
What do you think? Do people care? Enough?
Paul:
Certainly not enough, but more people care than you might guess. A lot
of the focus is on the commercial side now. Many companies are setting
up their own encrypted "tubes," for lack of a better word, between
themselves and their clients, and between themselves and their
employees. Commercial espionage is a huge, huge field lots of
important designs, sales plans, and documents are stolen all the time.
These are extremely valuable assets.
A lot of doctors, lawyers, accountants, and
investment people are starting to wake up to the fact that they're
handling important, valuable information of their own and other
people's, and that they need to protect it. It's hard for me to say
how many individuals "get" that their information is being taken from
them, but it's a large and growing number.
L:
There's a lot of talk about identity theft these days not so much
about concerns of Big Brother, which we can come back to later.
Identity theft does seem to be in the news a lot is this threat what
might finally wake the average Joe or Josephine up?
Paul:
I doubt it, not until it happens to them. Average folks might be more
likely to learn about it through their employers, as companies move
more and more to secure their data.
L:
We've probably already gone over most of our readers' heads, so let's
pause and go over some basics. What kind of problems could the average
person face who hasn't taken any steps to secure his or her
information? And how big is the problem is it rare like a lightning
strike or more common? Should the average guy or gal worry about this?
Paul:
First of all, people's information is being gathered without their
knowledge or consent every single day. Every email you send, personal
information on you is being gathered. Every time you visit a web site,
you reveal your IP address, which can be tied to you very easily.
L:
And you're not just talking about governments
Paul:
Right. There are people who grab this sort of information, and they
sell it. That makes it easy to build a dossier on somebody; a file
listing exactly what web sites they go to, how long they spend there,
where they go next, and whom they relate to.
L:
Who does this?
Paul:
Your emails are saved a number of ways by a number of parties.
Certainly, Google and Yahoo and all such services save emails. They
save drafts, not just emails the systems save automatically every
two minutes or so, and they save everything. Once they've got
it, they keep it.
L:
And those guys can be hacked or subpoenaed, which is just a
legalistic hack. But can anyone really use such a chaotic mish-mash of
data?
Paul:
Yes and Yes. It used to be that people would think in terms of word
searches people might worry, for example, about including the word
"bomb" in an email. But the searchers are way beyond that. They have
programs that can read the context of what you're saying.
L: I
didn't know that so much for being able to hide in the massive
volume of global communications.
Paul:
Hiding in the open was never a very secure strategy. But now they can
keep track of what you're saying and whom you're communicating with.
They can see how often you communicate with them, and whom they're
communicating with two, three, and four layers deep and this is
going on every single day. And these people are selling it to other
people.
L:
Let's be clear here. I can imagine Google selling demographic
information on users to advertisers, or at least the ability to target
certain groups of users without giving the data away. But I can't see
them selling dossiers on whom their Gmail users are communicating
with. Do you mean that third parties collect this same information as
it flows by on the Internet?
Paul:
I do. There are large markets, not only in raw data but in refined
data. Much of it is fully legal.
L:
Can you give us an example?
Paul:
Sure. A friend of mine was online with one of the big stock brokers
a well-known company I won't name to change an address or something
like that. They required my friend to fill in a security page. The
page asked, "Is your brother's name so-and-so and is his address
such-and-such?" The guy ignored the question and clicked through. Then
it asked, "Does your family come from such-and-such a place, and were
you raised at such an address in such a year, and then you bought a
house at this place at such a time?"
My friend was shocked and called their
office. "I never gave you that information," he said, "what is this?"
Their reply was: "We got it all from public sources. Nothing's illegal
about what we're doing; we're just keeping you safe by trying to
verify your identity."
This kind of information is being bought and
sold every day, all over the world.
L:
By whom?
Paul:
All the governments, for starters, which is really, really dangerous.
There are private parties as well, ranging from companies like Google
and Yahoo, to Eastern gangsters. The hackers gather information and
send it to data refineries that in turn link it to other data sets,
and sell that to the guys who steal identities and seize bank
accounts, and other things like that. It's a big, big deal.
L: I
can see this happening, but is it really possible for this to be
happening to everybody? How could anybody possibly have computers big
enough to store that much information on all the hundreds of millions
of people online all around the world?
Paul:
Well, I'm sorry to say that it's not that hard anymore. It's certainly
out of range for you and me, but if you run an intel bureau for any
medium-sized nation-state, it's not that hard. For two or three
billion dollars a year, you can surveil just about everything on the
Internet. You need an intelligence network in place that can place
sensors in key spots. Gathering the data is not that hard. The issue
now is searching the data and analyzing it taking this fire hose of
data and finding important bits in it that you need. That's still a
problem, but with computer technology increasing according to
Moore's Law, it's getting easier all the time.
L:
When this threat first came up, it seemed to me that there was no way
a federal bureau of information processors could keep up with all the
seventeen-year-olds in the world who are constantly creating
runarounds and hacks for things. But it sounds like I was being too
optimistic.
Paul:
I'm sorry to tell you that I think you were.
L: I
don't know if you can answer this, but is there anybody out there
selling packages of fake identities? Not stolen ones, but, for
example, a computer with a pre-installed history of cookies and
addresses that have been browsed, etc. something that gives you a
virtual history like what we might guess Mother Teresa would have
generated.
Paul:
I'm not aware of it happening, but it has been talked about. People
have talked about buying computers, using them for a while, and just
trading them among themselves every few months.
L:
Hm. All this data gathering and compiling, and making use of people's
information it all relies on people being ignorant about the process
and not doing anything about it. If lots of people start spoofing the
system, or misdirecting it, or hiding from it, then the whole problem
comes into question.
Paul:
Right. But the system can survive as it is, even with a lot of people
choosing to evade it, shall we say. The system can still go on, it'll
just be missing more and more people. They won't stop. Data theft is a
gigantic business. According to some fairly good estimates, the whole
industry made more profit than illegal drugs last year.
L:
Wow!
Paul:
I can't verify those numbers, but it was a pretty good organization
that did the research; and the numbers seem solid.
L:
How often does a person suddenly find their credit cards all maxed
out, their identity and banking info being used by somebody else, and
such? Is it one in a thousand, one in a million?
Paul:
I don't have proper numbers, but it's way more than one in a thousand.
It's more like one in a hundred. It's often small somebody gets a
credit card number and a couple of charges show up on your statement.
You notice it, you call, and eventually it gets straightened out. It
isn't always the full, flaming identity theft.
Sometimes they'll take over a bank account,
which they'll use for laundering money. They take over an account and
send it money, then send it to another, and another. Eventually they
take it out on the other end via Western Union.
L:
So, it's happening pretty frequently. And even if you haven't been hit
directly, you should be concerned because, at the very least, your and
everybody else's privacy is being violated. Odds are, every single
person reading this interview has information being collected on them,
and being passed around.
Paul:
No question. It happens everywhere, every day.
L:
What can the average person do, then? I remember when I was trying to
get people to use PGP encryption software. They had to figure out how
to use the software, and even though it was pretty intuitive (and got
more so over time), nobody wanted to bother. Even if it was just one
click integrated into their existing email client, it was too much.
They didn't want to have to take a single extra step. How do we deal
with that?
Paul:
There are actually two sides to that. One is that it's always easiest
to do nothing. If people don't care about their most intimate
communications, then there's not much you can do to change that. I
think a lot of people really don't want to know, because life is so
complex already and there are so many things going wrong in the world.
Maybe they are out of work. Maybe their brother is sick. Politics
chatters 24/7 on the TV, and it's very confusing always another
emergency. There's just too much, and people don't want to add more to
it.
L:
Yes
And this is a huge problem. It's not just the neighbor's tree
growing over the property line; it's a serious, potentially
life-altering threat. And worse, it doesn't have a simple solution
press this button and it's taken care of. Who wants to take on the
gargantuan task of protecting all this technology most people don't
really understand to begin with? Your hard drive, your email, your
Internet browsing history, and more it's just overwhelming.
Paul:
Yes, it is. There are people who are working on it, though. We have a
service called
Cryptohippie. It's pretty easy and provides really, really good
protection. My partner is one of the top computer security guys in the
world. It requires 15-20 minutes to set up. It's harder than doing
nothing, but it's not that bad. A few minutes to set up, $275 a year,
and then you can relax.
L: I
looked at your web site, and it seemed the focus was on businesses; is
there a service for individuals too?
Paul:
Our main product is called
Road Warrior. It's something any individual can install on his or
her computer. Whenever that machine is connected to us, you're
protected.
L:
What does that mean? Does it route communications securely, or does it
do anything to what's on your hard drive?
Paul:
We protect traffic. Having a firewall on your computer is also good,
and everyone should have one. There's a really good and free way
to protect your hard drive called
TrueCrypt.
It'll take about half an hour to 45 minutes to install it, but once
you do, you can very easily protect your hard drive. That leaves your
traffic, the thing we protect.
And it's important because even if you
secure your machine, every time you send an email, information is
leaving your machine. The smart thieves just pick up the data that's
in transit that's much easier and cheaper than breaking into your
hardware.
What we do to protect that data is set up an
encrypted connection from very deep in the guts of your machine to our
network. Once in our network, we have, for lack of a better word, a
"mixmaster" for data, and then it comes out the far side of our
network with the telltale information entirely removed. Our system is
jurisdictionally aware, which means that if you are in the United
States, for example, you won't go into our network in the U.S.
you'll enter in Canada, or Panama, or somewhere else, and come out
from a third jurisdiction. It breaks the chain that can lead back to
you.
L:
So, between my computer and, say, your Canadian entry point, it can't
be intercepted? The message is still going to need to have my email
address on it, so the recipient can hit reply and get back to me.
Paul:
That's pretty well solved. The connection between us and you is a very
highly encrypted connection. Let's say your ISP Verizon, AT&T,
whoever it might be they can see that bits are going back and forth
between you and the front door of our network, but they have no clue
what they are. It's just a fast stream of gibberish. Is it email? They
don't know. Is it web surfing? No one knows. Is it an FTP upload? No
one knows not even us.
L:
And on the other end? It still has to have my return address, if
nothing else.
Paul:
We have a setup for email that's included with all the accounts; it
strips the headers. So your email address is visible, but the route
back to where you are stops at our network.
L:
Okay. What about the content? Do you do anything about the content, or
do you encourage people to use PGP or GPG or something like that?
Paul:
Well, we obviously can't encrypt the last link of an email, or the
recipient won't be able to read it. There are two ways to handle that.
One, if the other person is also a member of our system, the email
never leaves our system; the communication is thoroughly encrypted
between you and the recipient. The other way is to use an encryption
program like PGP. GPG
is a free version. Both are excellent programs that work really
well. And they're not that hard to use. It's like anything with a
computer you need to pour yourself a cup of tea and sit down for
about 20 minutes and get it set up. But then you're done, and all
it'll take is just a few clicks to use it. And we highly recommend
that people do.
L:
What would you say to users who are concerned that they may secure
their traffic via a service like yours, but still be vulnerable when
they shop online and enter sensitive info, or have credit checks, etc.
Is there any point in communicating securely with an insecure world?
Paul:
At password-protected sites, you consciously disclose certain data for
certain purposes. So long as you know what data you have shared, you
are able to mitigate the risk. It is where everything you do or say is
available who-knows-where that you lose all control. That said, there
is no perfect security. The answer is to protect what you can, as best
you can. And thankfully, you can protect a great deal. Throwing up
your hands pretty much guarantees that you get creamed, sooner or
later.
L:
But don't the phishing experts concentrate on sites that collect such
data? What fraction of Black Hat efforts would you say focus on such
attacks, vs. the stream of data you secure?
Paul:
I can't put figures on it, but I'd say attacks were the old model, and
mass surveillance is the new model. Both exist and will continue to
exist.
L:
Okay, but to be fair, are there any other online anonymity services
people might want to consider? You obviously aren't going to think
they are as good as yours, but are there any that at least aren't
known to be data-collection points for Russian hackers, the IRS, or
other thieves?
Paul:
[Laughs] That's a hard question. There are many that are not known to
be black hats, but that doesn't mean they aren't. There are several
quality outfits, best I can tell.
Anonymizer is
one. There's one called Net Privacy, I think, and several others that
don't seem to be crooks. I don't think their level of protection is up
to ours, but I've never heard anything bad about them.
L:
This brings us to the question of trust. I know you or at least I
think I know you. Why should anybody else trust you?
Paul:
There are actually a couple of reasons. First, we do have a track
record in this business. People like you and Doug know who we are and
think of us as reliable human beings. Second, our organization is set
up so that you don't really have to trust us all that much. We don't
keep all of your data in any one place.
Cryptohippie isn't just one firm, it's
several firms. One company operates the network, and they do not have
any customer information never. The other company is the sales
company; and they have the basic customer information, such as contact
and billing information. But the network never gets that.
So let's say that one of us gets tossed in
jail, and we're ordered to give all the information "or else." It
won't do the Bad Guys any good, as it takes three different people to
decrypt critical information in our system, and each of them is far
away on a separate continent. All the primary people are scattered on
different continents. I suppose anything's possible, but it'd be
pretty tough to get any information out of us.
L:
Is your setup transparent to cypherpunks and others who can
independently verify it? What you're saying sounds good to me, but I'm
not a programmer; I can't tell if what you're telling me is true or is
just a sales pitch that some government agent told you to tell me.
Paul:
If we had somebody who was a real serious security guy a guy like
Bruce Schneier
or similar well-known security expert call us up and ask to look at
our systems, we'd let him look at everything. That would not be a
problem to us.
L:
Fair enough: I guess you can't just put the software out there,
because then you'd just create your own competition. But what about
Big Brother? When governments turn bad, even good people have reason
to fear. Is your system government-proof?
Paul:
It's almost government-proof. There are certain really expensive,
really hard attacks that are able to trace somebody, but it costs so
many millions of dollars that it isn't going to be used against
anybody except the single most valuable targets to them. It's simply
not feasible to put that much effort into tracking everyone, or even
lots of people.
L:
Let's clarify that you mean it costs millions to track a single
person's emails when they use privacy systems like yours?
Paul:
Right. To track a single person who would be protected by a system
like ours thankfully we're unaware of having any serious bad guys in
our system, and we sure don't want 'em it'd be very, very difficult
for them. They'd have to do some real exotic technical stuff, they'd
need a worldwide surveillance network, and lots of computer
power.
L:
If that's true, then in this environment in which the government has
everybody scared about money laundering and terrorism and all the wars
they're engaged in, how is it that they allow a service like yours to
exist?
Paul:
What we're doing is not illegal, and they haven't bothered us. I
suppose if we grew to millions of subscribers that might change, but
so far, what we do is entirely legal.
L:
So far. I suppose that if systems like yours grew large enough to be
perceived as a threat by governments around the world, they might
coordinate and try to round you all up and break into the system but
that'd be a huge undertaking and would require the cooperation of some
governments that don't get along that well. Not likely anytime soon.
And even if it did happen, the system would still keep information out
of the hands of private-sector Bad Guys.
Paul:
Agreed.
L:
Well, I have to say that I'm a little uncomfortable with the way this
interview has shaped up a bit like an infomercial. But this is an
important topic, and Doug and I knew you knew more about it than
either of us, so here we are. Let me go on the record saying that we
have no business relationship with Paul or Cryptohippie, and that if
any readers want to buy his service, we won't get a penny from the
sale.
At any rate, thanks for your time, Paul
it's been a very sobering but important talk.
Paul:
My pleasure.
----
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