Last Thursday I received
an email from David Meier, Associate Advisor at the
MotleyFool concerning Debt-Deflation.
David asked if I had any comments on his article
Debt-deflation: Just the beginning? Here is a
partial listing:
The debate rages on.
Is inflation or deflation the bigger threat? There are lots of people -- lots of smart people -- on both sides of the debate and they present lots of good arguments. One thing that I have not seen -- and maybe I just missed it -- was an analysis using Irving Fisher's debt-deflation framework. So I decided to put one together myself and to inject my understanding of what Bernanke is try to do to stop deflation from taking hold.
The question I keep coming back to, especially as I read more about the situation Japan faced (I'm reading everything I can by Richard Koo, including his book "The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics."
And just to make sure I am not being one-sided, I am countering my fears of deflation with "Monetary Regimes and Inflation" by Peter Bernholz, which should arrive next week.
Without further ado, below is my research on debt-deflation.
Dave
Dave's research is a
70 Slideshow Page On Debt-Deflation that is easy
enough to read or download from Scribd.
Here is my response ....
You should not be afraid of deflation.
You should be afraid of policies attempting to fight
it.
Deflation (rather
price deflation) is actually the natural
state of affairs. As productivity increases, more
goods and services are produced relative to the
population and prices would therefore be expected to
drop.
It is the Fed, along with misguided Keynesian and
Monetarist economists who think falling prices are a
bad thing. Who amongst us does not like falling
prices (except of course on things we own like
houses, but even then who is not sick of higher
property taxes that result)?
The reality is inflation benefits those with first
access to money. Guess who that is? The answer is
easy: banks, government, and the already wealthy.
Inflation is actually a tax on the middle class and
the poor who get access to money last. During the
housing bubble, by the time the poor could get
access to to money easily, it was far too late to
buy.
Given that inflation benefits those with first
access to money, any targeted inflation at all is
morally wrong.
Note that Congress has passed 300+ affordable
housing measures over the years and all of them
failed. The irony now is Congress has simultaneously
passed measures hoping to prop up the price of homes
while seeking still additional money to create
affordable housing.
Home prices need to fall (and will fall) to levels
of affordability based on wages and wage growth
regardless of what the Fed does. Thus, efforts to
prop up prices are triply stupid: They are costly;
They they will not work (prices will fall to where
they are headed anyway); and they will delay a
recovery.
Deflation is only bad in the context of the
short-term pain it will involve. Moreover, it is
important to remember that the pain of deflation is
relative to the inflation party that preceded it.
That party must be paid for either in terms of time
or price.
Following the
Footsteps of Japan
The irony is Greenspan and Bernanke repeatedly
criticized the Bank of Japan for not writing off bad
bank debts. So what do we do?
We are
Following the Footsteps of Japan even though we
have proven without a shadow of a doubt it is
economic insanity.
Psychology of
Deflation Revisited
In January 2007, someone on the Motley Fool told me
"Too even compare the citizens of Japan to the US is
stupid, stupid, stupid Forest Gump!"
I was also told "Fannie Mae can revive the housing
bubble" and that I "ignore an enormous amount of
1990s monetary theory by Bernanke and co about how
they would have dealt with Japans deflation."
Inquiring minds can read
Q&A on the Psychology of Deflation to see my
replies.
It now seems that
Things That "Can't" Happen, did happen.
Indeed
Economic Madness Is Repeatedly Endless
Bernanke's
Deflation Preventing Scorecard
In case no one is keeping track, Bernanke has now
fired every bullet from his 2002 “helicopter
drop” speech
Deflation: Making Sure "It" Doesn't Happen Here.
Misunderstanding
Japan's Lost Two Decades
Richard Koo of Nomura Research Institute Ltd. says
U.S. Risks Japan-Like ‘Lost Decade’ on Stimulus
Exit.
I say
U.S. Faces Second Lost Decade "Because" of Misguided
Stimulus
Real Lesson of
Japan's Lost Decades
The real lesson is no matter how much money you
throw around, economies cannot recover until
uncollectible debts and malinvestments are written
off. That is why you have “zero interest rates and
still nothing’s happening.”
The moment fiscal stimulus stops economies are
virtually guaranteed to relapse until asset bubbles
deflate, and malinvestments and bad debts are
written off.
Bailing out the banks did nothing to fix these
problems. Consumers are still saddled in debt, in
underwater mortgages, with no job. Moreover, there
is no driver for jobs given rampant overcapacity in
nearly every sector.
Banks do not want to lend in this kind of
environment so they don't. Businesses do not want to
expand in this kind of environment so they don't.
Meanwhile the Obama administration is making matters
worse by increasing taxes on small businesses and
proposing everyone pay for health insurance, with
businesses forced to offer a plan or pony up part of
the cost.
This too is giving small businesses an incentive not
to hire. Housing prices are too high yet the
Administration and Congress are hell bent on
propping up prices. The solution is to let prices
fall until they are affordable.
Illusion of
Stimulus
Recoveries based on stimulus are nothing but an
illusion. Here is a snip worth reading from
U.S. Faces Second Lost Decade "Because" of Misguided
Stimulus written by my friend "HB" about
Christina Romer, chair of Obama's Council of
Economic Advisers.
I know Christina Romer best for her misinterpretation of what happened in 1937-38. She believes that the fallback into full-scale depression from 'depression light' (as evidenced by unemployment in 1938 almost returning to the highest levels of the depression trough 32/33) is proof that it was a mistake to tighten policy (fiscal and monetary) too early.
In other words, according to her, if the Fed had continued pumping as furiously as possible, then everything would have been alright.
In reality, the entire inflationary mini-boomlet-within-the-depression was simply an illusion. 'GDP growth' that is bought with monetary pumping and feckless fiscal spending only misdirects and ultimately consumes even more scarce capital.
Fiscal stimulus may temporarily give the impression of a recovery, but it is not a genuine recovery. It makes things worse. The moment the pumping is abandoned, the true state of affairs is simply unmasked. That is what happened in 37/38 - a slight tightening of monetary policy revealed the fact that the mini-boomlet was as unsound as its predecessor boom in the years prior to the '29 crash.
It would not have been possible to hide this reality forever. There is nothing, absolutely nothing, that government intervention can achieve in terms of 'fixing' the economy. The choice was in either abandoning the unsound policy and the unsound investments it produced, or careen toward a complete destruction of the currency system.
Once again, I stand amazed at how people can look at this, and look at Japan, and look at the housing bubble/bust sequence, and still believe that monetary pumping and deficit spending are viable tools of economic policy when a bust occurs. It really boggles the mind, reminding me of Einstein's definition of insanity, 'doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result'.
Understanding
Velocity
David had several slides on velocity. The important
point he missed is that velocity of money is a
result not
a cause of anything to come.
Velocity is falling because the Fed is printing
hoping to stimulate the economy but banks are not
lending because
1) credit risks are high
2) there is rampant overcapacity everywhere, thus
businesses have no reason to expand
3) credit worthy consumers do not want to borrow
The attitudes of lenders and potential borrowers
have changed. Under these conditions, the more
Bernanke prints, the lower velocity will go.
Spending Collapses
In All Generation Groups
Please consider
Spending Collapses In All Generation Groups
It's no secret that boomers fearing an underfunded
retirement have sharply cut spending. However, it's
not just boomers cutting back. Consumer attitudes
toward debt have changed across all age groups.
Bernanke can flood the world with "reserves" and
indeed he has. However, he cannot force banks to
lend or consumers to borrow.
Here is a simple analogy that everyone should be
able to understand: You can lead a horse to water
but you cannot make it drink. And if the horse does
not want to drink, it was a waste of time and energy
to lead the horse to the water.
In a debt-based economy, it is extremely difficult
(by monetary policy) to produce inflation if
consumers will not participate. And as noted above,
demographics and attitudes strongly suggest
consumers have had enough of debt and spending
sprees.
Government bodies like Congress can theoretically
produce inflation but Japan tried and failed for
years.
Uncharted Territory
In the US and globally we are in uncharted
territory. Odds are we will see many things we have
never seen before as stimulus after stimulus fails
to produce desired results.
I ask you to consider
Twelve Reasons For A Job Loss Recovery.
Humpty Dumpty On
Depression Conditions
The conditions now are very similar to what happened
in the great depression, discounting for the moment
this reflationary effort by the Fed that is doomed
to fail.
For more on the conditions one would expect to see
in deflation please consider
Humpty Dumpty On Inflation.
Some of those conditions have changed since
December. However, bank failures, total bank credit,
and short term treasury yields near 0% have not.
Moreover, long term yields have ticked up but they
are still at historic lows compared to anything but
the lows last December.
It is important not to confuse a recovery in the
stock market with an economic recovery.
Don't just take my word for it. Please consider
Leading indicators and the shape of the recovery
by Paul Krugman?
Michael Shedlock has an awesome takedown of ECRI’s claim that its indicators (a) have successfully predicted turning points in the past (b) point to a sold recovery now. I’d add that this is a really, really bad time to be relying on conventional indicators.
Why? Basically, because in a zero-interest rate world — the three-month rate was .066% last I looked — especially one that’s suffered from a collapse of the shadow banking system, conventional indicators don’t mean what they usually mean. Increases in the monetary base aren’t especially expansionary. The yield curve more or less has to slope up, even if no recovery is expected. And so on.
So historical correlations, to the extent that they exist — and as Shedlock points out, ECRI is claiming a much better record than it really has — can’t be counted on to prevail. There’s really no alternative to making fundamental analyses of the macro situation.
One important point to
note is this is a credit bubble bust, similar to the
Great Depression, not an earnings scare recession,
or a routine business cycle recession.
This is a once in several generational event. I bet
the ECRIs leading indicators applied in April of
1930 would have looked quite similar.
One thing is for sure, is that Krugman does not hold
any grudges. I sure have to give him credit for
that. I also happen to agree with Krugman when it
come to free trade for which we are both strong
proponents.
Unfortunately however, there is a rising tide of
protectionism in Congress and this Administration.
Note that the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act is one of the
things that made the Great Depression much worse.
States are repeating another mistake by raising
property taxes.
Keynesian Model
Broken Beyond Repair
The Keynesian and Monetarist models are broken
beyond repair.
It is amazing that so much love exists for a man
whose ideas have been thoroughly discredited on many
occasions. Here is a little blurb from the
American Journal of Economics and Sociology.
The crisis policy devised by John Maynard (Lord) Keynes, which seemed to work well during World War II and in postwar reconstruction, met its nadir in 1975. Contrary to Keynesian theory, formalized in the Phillips Curve argument that inflation and mass unemployment are mutual trade offs, double digit inflation and record unemployment made further deficit spending an impossible policy.
In case you fail to
understand the implications, Keynes is arguing one
cannot have a recession and inflation at the same
time.
Did The Keynesian
Economists Give Up Their Theories Confronted With
Japan?
The answer is no. Stagflation in the 70's
discredited Keyensian theory as did Japan's building
bridges to nowhere.
Keynesian economists now say the problem was Japan
simply did not act fast enough.
The amount of global monetary stimulus thrown at
curing the deflation problem is staggering. Yet here
we are with the same debt overhang, no jobs, and no
way to pay off that debt. Deflation looms larger
than ever because of Central Bank efforts to fight
it.
Let's return to the beginning. It's important to
remember that inflation and deflation about not
about prices but rather about the expansion of money
supply and credit. Concern over prices is putting
the cart before the horse.
Fantasizing In
Academic Wonderland
Keynesian academic models do not work in a real
world, with real people, where attitudes and global
forces such as global wage arbitrage are in play.
The Fed cannot force consumers to borrow or banks to
lend. Nor can the Fed create jobs. Congress can
create makeshift jobs but as we have shown above,
makeshift jobs cannot possibly create a solid
economic foundation.
In response to the above someone is sure to tell me
how negative interest rates could be used to force
banks to lend. My response is forcing banks to lend
cannot and will not work in actual practice.
One reason Bernanke wanted to pay interest on
reserves was to slowly recapitalize them over time.
One cannot achieve that while forcing them to lend.
Moreover forcing banks to lend will do nothing but
increase further writeoffs.
Again, it is important to look at how things operate
in a real world model, with real consequences, as
opposed to
fantasizing in academic wonderland about how
to force banks to lend.
Fiat World
Mathematical Model
Logically speaking, when the problem is debt is to
high, it is insane to think a spending spree will
fix the problem. Even a 6th grader would be able to
understand this, but Keynesian and Monetarist
academic wonks just cannot manage the task.
Greenspan stimulated the economy in 2002 and all we
have to show for it is a collapsing housing bubble
and still more debt.
Instead of following a Keynesian model that does not
work, please consider a
Fiat World Mathematical Model.
I believe Steve Keen and I have it correct. In a
credit-based, fiat-currency model, deflation will
always manifest itself as debt-deflation. Price
deflation is a meaningless sideshow.
I am not sure how far along we are with debt
deflation given that much depends on how far and how
long the Fed and Congress attempts to fight it. The
preliminary results however, do not look very good.
I expect a second lost decade in the US, just as
happened in Japan.

